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Art as Political Discourse
Vid Simoniti
Much art is committed to political causes. However, does art contribute something unique to 
political discourse, or does it merely reflect the insights of political science and political philosophy? 
Here I argue for indispensability of art to political discourse by building on the debate about artistic 
cognitivism, the view that art is a source of knowledge. Different artforms, I suggest, make available 
specific epistemic resources, which allow audiences to overcome epistemic obstacles that obtain in a 
given ideological situation. My goal is to offer a general model for identifying cognitive advantages 
for artworks belonging to distinct artforms and genres (e.g. satire, visibility-raising artworks, 
caricatures, and so on), in a way that can account for each artwork’s historical and cultural 
specificity. More speculatively, however, my account also comments on the ancient struggle between 
philosophy and the arts as competing modes of persuasion, and expands our notion of legitimate 
political discourse to include a greater plurality of discursive genres.
1. Politically Discursive Art
Gerhard Richter’s portrait of his uncle wearing a Nazi uniform, Uncle Rudi (1965), ad-
dresses the subject of intergenerational guilt in Germany; Margaret Atwood’s novel The 
handmaid’s tale (1985) critiques patriarchal oppression through a story set in a dystopian 
future society; Public Enemy’s hip-hop album Fear of a Black Planet (1990) tackles institu-
tional racism in the USA; Jasmila Žbanić’s film Esma’s Secret (2006) narrates the story of 
a rape survivor raising her child, broaching this difficult subject in the aftermath of the 
Yugoslav wars. We can categorize such works as politically discursive art, in the sense that 
they are recognizably about a political issue: audiences receive such works as contributions 
to a debate in the public sphere. While in the first half of the twentieth century, the very 
idea of political content in art had to be defended—for example, in W. E. B. Du Bois’ 
defence of anti-racist art (Du Bois, 1926) or in Walter Benjamin’s defence of ‘tendentious 
art’ and the role of the author as ‘producer’ (Benjamin, 1934/1999)—in our own time, 
art has become an undeniably political forum. From TV series to hip-hop albums, from 
feminist ‘craftivism’ to environmentalist land art, the artist’s licence to display overt pol-
itical tendencies through her work is hardly in doubt.
Nevertheless, what role such politically discursive art performs may be questioned. 
For example, should we say that Atwood’s novel merely reflects feminist criticism of patri-
archal society, or does it add something to that criticism in a way that a feminist theorist 
might? Fear of a Black Planet may motivate one to notice the racism experienced in the 
United States, but does it itself contribute to political discourse about racism in a way that 
a manifesto might? The question I propose to address, accordingly, is this: can politically 
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discursive art contribute something distinct to political debate on specific topics, or does 
it simply rehearse positions arrived at in other disciplines?
Before we tackle the question, a brief methodological note is in order. The background 
to my enquiry will be ideas of deliberative democracy: broadly speaking, the thought that 
political debate takes place within a public sphere, within which different modes of com-
munication are available to participants. The key question for theorists of public reason in 
deliberative democracy—such as John Rawls, Amy Gutmann and Jürgen Habermas—is 
what deliberative norms will ensure outcomes that are both fairly arrived at and are likely 
to be correct. To establish art’s contribution to discourse, I  therefore suggest that we 
compare political art with argument-driven forms of public debate, which are typically 
presented as ideal within a well-ordered public discourse. Admittedly, some readers will 
find this set-up as already too optimistic about the merits of deliberative democracy. Indeed, 
the connection between art and politics has been much more readily studied within crit-
ical theory traditions such as the Frankfurt school and poststructuralism, which begin 
with a radical scepticism of the public sphere—viewing it as already deeply comprom-
ised by unequal power relations and false consciousness—and then posit art as a kind of 
counterweight to that sphere (the work of Theodor Adorno is perhaps most representative 
here). To put my cards on the table: the picture I build here will, by contrast, allow for 
considerable faith in the public sphere in modern democracies, although I hope the rela-
tionship between my position and some of the valid worries traditionally expressed in 
critical theory will become clearer later in the paper.
I begin the investigation by pointing to a related view in contemporary aesthetics—cog-
nitivism about art—in order to formulate the problem of parity between art and non-art 
discourse. I delineate my view—that art yields discursive knowledge—from views that 
it yields experiential or practical knowledge. Then, in Section 3, I will offer a case against 
parity in the political context. Making use of John Rawls’ and Jürgen Habermas’ accounts 
of public reason, I will construct an argument for the pre-eminence of the objective style 
of political discourse. In Section 4, I will resist that case, arguing that there are instances 
where the very attempt to inhabit the objective style may leave us worse off epistemically 
and that, in those cases, political art can be epistemically superior. I illustrate my argu-
ment with two examples in Section 5, before addressing objections in Section 6.
2. The Problem of Parity
Artistic cognitivism is the claim that art makes available non-trivial knowledge, in a way 
that is particular to it as art. Several philosophers have argued for cognitivism by pointing 
out an overlap between artistic and systematic forms of justification: works of art, just like 
systematic discourse, can provide thought experiments (Camp, 2009), can offer examples 
of virtue and vice (Carroll, 2002), can encourage inductive reasoning from examples 
to general conclusions (Putnam, 1978), can appeal to emotions to motivate arguments 
(Nanay, 2013) and can clarify concepts by offering particular applications for them (John, 
1998). We might designate these philosophical efforts as formulating an ‘argument from 
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we, as philosophers, already recognize as conducive to knowledge. This may be easily 
translated into a political context. Atwood’s The handmaid’s tale (1985) may be thought 
of as a carefully constructed thought experiment of a life lived under extreme misogyny; 
Public Enemy’s Fear of a Black Planet (1990) may be said to conceptually clarify the concept 
‘systemic racism’ by giving clear examples of it. By using such legitimate devices of pol-
itical discourse, each artwork thereby furthers our understanding of the political issues 
it tackles.
So, art clearly can contribute to political discourse. However, the initial problem that 
artistic cognitivism sought to address, chiefly in the 1990s and 2000s, was the question 
of whether art could yield any valuable knowledge at all (Lamarque and Olsen, 1994, 
pp. 324ff, 68, 84–5, 402ff). With that worry by now largely laid to rest, a further problem 
arises: the problem of epistemic parity between art and non-artistic disciplines. Consider 
this analogy. You are having a drunken late-night conversation about politics with a par-
ticularly brilliant friend. Even though that conversation does not conform to the rigours 
of academic discourse, it is presumably possible to learn much from it. While desultory 
and digressive, the conversation might still contain valid argumentation and truthful as-
sertions, even singular moments of inspiration. Still, it is also true that you would have ac-
quired the relevant knowledge more efficiently were your friend not inebriated and could 
have organized her thoughts more systematically. The worry now is that art is just like 
your brilliant, drunken friend: overlap does not guarantee parity. Since non-art political 
discourse has only one aim (to deepen our understanding of political issues), it can absorb 
any mechanism found in art (such as detailed thought experiments or emotionally forceful 
examples) and apply them exactly as needed without getting distracted with other aims 
(such as plot pacing in fiction, or rhyme in hip hop). While the arts may do well, and even 
very well, at progressing knowledge, there remains a possibility that the arts will always 
be worse at securing knowledge than theoretical disciplines. This is the problem of parity.
In choosing how we deal with the problem of parity, the cognitivist about art encoun-
ters an interesting fork in the road. The first option is to propose that there exist special 
kinds of knowledge, which art is especially good at securing. Some philosophers have put 
forward the idea that art offers experiential insights (e.g. Gaut, 2007, pp. 141–202; Green, 
2010; Walton 1990, pp. 25–30, 34–35, 95, 211), or that art yields practical moral wisdom 
(e.g. Carroll, 2002; Gaut, 2007, pp. 163ff; Nussbaum, 1990, pp. 148–67). Now, the 
exact nature of these claims varies from philosopher to philosopher, and some of them 
can be interpreted as also leaning towards the ‘overlap’ claims mentioned above. But the 
important point is this: insofar as one insists that experiential and practical knowledge ar-
rived at through art are truly distinct from the more propositional knowledge pursued by 
argumentation, then it is easy to overcome the problem of parity. Art then reigns over its 
own realm of non-propositional, non-paraphrasable insight (cf. Nussbaum, 1990, pp. 4–5), 
while systematic intellectual disciplines are left confined to their own domain.
To insist on a clear distinction between different domains of knowledge, however, 
strikes me as unsuitable for the politically discursive artworks. Politically discursive 
works broach a thesis, a point or a subject that is clearly legible from the purview of 
other disciplines (it is for this reason that these works have been disparagingly called 
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routinely points to the subject of intergenerational guilt in Germany, and the reception 
of Atwood’s The handmaid’s tale points towards a critique of patriarchal relations. But 
such subjects are fully debatable through political science or philosophy. Therefore, if 
artworks make genuine contribution to our understanding of such subjects, their con-
tribution cannot be of a radically different kind, and must be interrogable by systematic 
disciplines.
For this reason, I propose to take a different path, and to insist that political art and 
systematic disciplines are after knowledge of the same kind. The kind of knowledge in 
question will, to a large degree, be propositional (it will include statements about how the 
world is, or how it ought to be), but we need not get too caught up in the propositional-
practical-experiential distinction, sometimes imported into philosophy of art from ana-
lytic epistemology. Two other clarifications are more important. First, by invoking the 
term ‘knowledge’ in the political context, I mean to assume that some epistemic progress 
can be made in the realm of politics, although this allows that there may be areas of un-
certainty that we shall never fully settle (we may never know what a perfect society looks 
like, but we now know that feudalism is not it). Secondly, a contrast seems to obtain 
between discursive propositional knowledge, such as knowledge about the nature of toler-
ance, and mundane propositional knowledge, such as knowing that ‘it is raining outside’. 
We can obtain mundane propositional knowledge simply from perception or from testi-
mony. Discursive knowledge, by contrast, is a matter of more complex processes of justifica-
tion. A subject can be said to have understood more, say, about the nature of patriarchy, if 
she has considered a greater number of theories and facts, and worked through her con-
ceptual schemas. The knowledge we are after is arrived at by more intellectually exerting 
routes than simply looking through the window or asking the teacher.
Against this background, we must push our analysis of art further than the 'argument 
of overlap' did. The task is to address the problem of parity anew, to show that art is not 
a second-best path to knowledge, and to do so without invoking a distinct sphere of know-
ledge. In other words, we are back in the midst of Plato’s ancient quarrel between poetry 
and philosophy in Plato’s original formulation, that is, their quarrel over the same do-
main—the domain of politics—where what matters is truth, justice and careful thinking 
(cf. Plato, 2000, X 607b5–6).
3. The Pre-eminence of the Objective Style
In the analogy above, art corresponded to the intoxicated friend. But that correspondence 
is not in fact an obvious one. Why should the drunken friend not be, say, political phil-
osophy or political science?
The anti-art assumption seems to be a natural one to make from within philosophy 
itself. Especially in analytic philosophy, we have come to value a certain measured style 
that comprises perspicacious structuring of arguments, clear signposting, definite conclu-
sions, systematic presentation of evidence, elimination of the author’s distinct voice and 
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stylistic properties. We may call such a style the ‘objective style’ of discourse. We find one 
manifesto-like defence of it in Timothy Williamson’s Philosophy of Philosophy:
We need the unglamorous virtue of patience to read and write philosophy that is as 
perspicuously structured as the difficulty of the subject requires, and the austerity to 
be dissatisfied with appealing prose that does not meet those standards. The fear of 
boring oneself or one’s readers is a great enemy of truth.
(Williamson, 2007, p. 288)
Following this line of reasoning, art would almost certainly count among the enemies 
of truth; after all, few artists set out to bore their audiences. However, it is not yet clear 
what exactly might justify our preference for the objective style when we speak of political 
discourse. After all, discourse that is so boring and unglamorous that nobody has the pa-
tience to engage with it would hardly convince anybody. To mount an argument in favour 
of the objective style, we need to reflect on the proper procedure of acquiring knowledge 
through a political debate. A suitable philosophical portrait of such a process may be bor-
rowed from democratic discourse theory in its original form; here I shall draw on two 
best-known exponents, John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas.
While following different political programmes, both Rawls and Habermas have de-
fended the notion of public reason: the idea that the legitimacy of political rules depends 
not simply on the agreement of actual citizens, but on what would be agreed by suitably 
idealized rational subjects. For Rawls, only ‘reasonable’ subjects form the constituency of 
public reason. These are the subjects who can temporarily bracket their own interests, 
position, substantive opinions or religious views, as suggested by the veil of ignorance of 
Rawls’ ‘original position’ (Rawls, 1997, pp. 769–73; Rawls, 2005, pp. 22–23, 47–59). 
Habermas’ early theory of communicative rationality similarly stipulates that those 
engaging in public argumentation must assume an ‘ideal speech situation’ (Habermas, 
1970; for elaboration, see Brand, 1990, pp. 11, 19–24, 28–29). Here, subjects do not seek 
to coerce each other’s opinions (what Habermas calls ‘strategic action’) but jointly aim 
to find inherently good solutions (‘communicative action’) (Habermas, 1984, pp. 87–88, 
94–96). As with Rawls’ reasonable subjects, the participants in an ideal speech situation 
weigh different political options impartially, such that ‘the structure of [the participants’] 
communication rules out all external or internal coercion other than the force of the 
better argument‘ (Habermas, 1990, pp.  88–89). Neither Rawls nor Habermas is pri-
marily concerned with the question of what rhetorical style should be employed under the 
idealized conditions of political discourse they describe. And yet, the picture they paint 
tends towards the objective style.
In Political Liberalism, for example, Rawls suggests that reasonable subjects ought to abide 
by the duty of civility to one another—that is, be willing to explain how their political 
preferences derive from impartial concerns (Rawls, 2005, pp. 217). He also introduces 
the requirement that they should do so in an accessible way (Rawls, 2005, p. 162n28), 
and elsewhere calls for ‘public occasions of orderly and serious discussion of fundamental 
questions and issues of public policy’ (Rawls, 1997, p. 772, my emphasis). Rawls gives the 
measured and impartial style in which the Justices of the Supreme Court should ideally 
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all forms of public reason be free of the attempt to manipulate the other party, and should 
in principle be justifiable in the ideal speech situation of giving reasons and yielding to 
better arguments: ‘Even the most fleeting of speech-act offers, the most conventional 
yes/no responses, rely on potential reasons’. (Habermas, 1996, p. 19; cited in Allen, 2012, 
p. 356) For this reason, as one commentator noted, Habermas demands that speakers 
in the ideal situation should avoid insincerity, self-contradiction and inconsistent use of 
terms and irony (Panagia, 2004, pp. 832–33).
What is here stipulated is a certain match between idealized political subjects and the 
manner of their deliberations. Reasonable participants in public discourse, as we saw, have 
a duty to expurgate idiosyncratic epistemic obstacles: their individual biases, their desire 
for dominating others, and so forth. They affirm this commitment to reasonableness by 
addressing themselves only to those epistemic obstacles that are indelible and shared: 
obstacles such as the inherent difficulty of the arguments involved, the unavailability of 
evidence or the vagueness of shared concepts (these are what Rawls calls the ‘burdens of 
judgment’; Rawls, 2005, pp. 56–57). For such obstacles, the objective style of reasoning 
will be best-suited. The objective style separates the speaker’s idiosyncratic position from 
the content of her arguments and, by eliminating such features as wilful self-contradiction 
or lack of seriousness, the objective style is also the most accessible—that is, easiest for 
other reasonable participants to follow.
This rationalist picture of public reason is, it ought to be noted, no longer as dominant in 
political theory as when Rawls and Habermas first formulated it. Some proponents of de-
liberative democracy have become more open to forms of communication that go beyond 
argumentation, especially when considering the real, rather than idealized, conditions of 
democratic deliberation (Polletta and Gardner, 2018). The case I intend to formulate for 
political art is broadly aligned with such developments. That being said, the rationalist 
model is still at the core of democratic deliberation theory (cf. Goodin, 2018) and, even 
in its expanded format, provides a foil for artistic forms. Art does not fit snugly with its 
demands: ruminative paintings about guilt do not even offer clear-cut conclusions, and 
hip-hop albums do not abide by the ‘duty of civility’. So, let us, for now, distil the ration-
alist model of public reason into an argument for the pre-eminence of the objective genre, 
and consider the implications such an argument has for works of political art.
The first premise of the argument here is that, at the commencement of any political en-
quiry, reasonable subjects should aspire to the idealized condition of speech. They should 
try to reduce their individual epistemic obstacles as much as possible: bracket their biases, 
but also brace themselves against boredom and distraction. What degree of idealization 
we should expect of real-life participants can be debated (cf. Vallier, 2018, §2.4); how-
ever, it seems clear that the subjects should aspire to be as impartial and public-minded 
as possible. Let us call such an aspirational state—the state with the fewest possible epi-
stemic obstacles—the state of discursive rationality. Importantly, the first premise need 
not stipulate that participants in public discourse should ever actually achieve that state, 
merely that it is something we should aspire towards. And that seems self-evident: the 
state with the fewest epistemic obstacles is the one we should aspire towards.
The second premise is that the objective genre is best-suited to a subject in the state of 
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and impartially laying out evidence, the objective style is directed precisely at the re-
maining, indelible obstacles of any enquiry. The objective style makes no concessions 
to laziness, or to biases, or to being easily distracted, or indeed to the propensity to be 
moved by anything other than the force of the better argument. The various features 
typical of the arts, such as plot pacing, concerns with rhythm or creation of thoughtful 
aporias, on the other hand, are not directed at the indelible epistemic obstacles—namely, 
the difficulty of arguments or unavailability of evidence. Precisely those devices that sep-
arate art from objective discourse are, then, at best superfluous and at worst distracting.
What follows from these premises—that we should aspire to discursive rationality, 
and that the objective style is best-suited to that state—is a certain elite position for the 
objective genre. The reasonable subject and the objective style of discourse are a good 
fit; they are the model enquirer and the model medium of any intellectual investigation. 
It may be observed that, in reality, the rhetorical styles in public debates are a lot more 
mixed (there are, for example, more subjective forms of journalism and more personal 
modes of public address). But the compass of epistemic prestige in political discourse will 
point towards the stylistically objective elements, just as Williamson suggests for phil-
osophy in general. There is, then, no parity between objective political discourse (phil-
osophy, political science, serious journalism, and so on) and the arts.
Still, this argument does not imply that the proper attitude of the philosopher towards 
the arts should be one of disparagement; rather, it should be a kind of patronizing encour-
agement. The arts, as we saw, overlap with other forms of public discourse. They may 
therefore serve those public discussants who, due to some circumstantial weakness or 
disadvantage, cannot quite aspire to the state of discursive rationality (cf. Polletta and 
Gardner, 2018, pp. 72–3). For somebody easily bored, for example, Atwood’s gripping 
narrative in The handmaid’s tale may be a useful introduction to ideas about anti-patriarchy. 
For somebody daunted by the turgid texts on social justice, rap albums may provide a 
more engaging way to think through oppressions of racism. Equally, we might say that 
introductions to philosophy (but not serious texts) may take a literary form, such as 
Jostein Gaarder’s Sophie’s world (1991) or Timothy Williamson’s own Tetralogue (2015). 
The arts may, then, play a sort of didactic, kindergartenly handmaiden to philosophy. For 
discursive knowledge of the highest kind, we must still ascend to the clear-sighted indus-
triousness of the objective style.
4. Plurality of Rhetorical Modes
Our aim now is to defuse the argument for the pre-eminence of the objective genre. I pro-
pose that we take no issue with the second premise: that the objective genre is best-suited 
to subjects who have already arrived at the state of discursive rationality. I like to imagine 
such subjects as the souls in Dante’s Paradiso, the non-omniscient but ideally rational be-
ings, who would probably have little use for political art of any sort. I propose that we 
dislodge the first premise instead and claim that aspiring towards the state of discursive ra-
tionality—bracketing one’s biases and so forth—is not always the epistemically best thing 
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important ambiguity at work here. If we conceive of ‘aspiration’ as merely ‘the desire to 
be in’, then we ought to agree with the first premise: the state with the fewest epistemic 
obstacles is the epistemically most desirable. However, if we conceive of ‘aspiration’ as ‘an 
attempt to inhabit’, then the premise becomes less obviously appealing. We must ask, in 
other words, whether, for people like ourselves, there might not obtain situations where 
the effort of hoisting ourselves up to that exalted position would backfire, create new epi-
stemic obstacles or fail to dispel the ones that exist. We will have to fill in some details 
here. Who are ‘people like ourselves’? What sorts of beings might stumble and scratch 
their knees when reaching for the highest echelons of rationality?
Recent social epistemology has pointed out various ways in which epistemic obstacles 
form part of our social background: injustice may be woven into publicly available con-
cepts (Fricker, 2007, pp. 18–27), into our sense of identity (Stanley, 2015, pp. 196–201; 
elaborating on Stebbing 1939, p. 33), and may be inherent in psychological attitudes like 
closed-mindedness or dogmatism (Cassam, 2019, Chapters 2–4). If we accept that such 
obstacles are pervasive and recalcitrant, there is a genuine question as to whether taking a 
deep breath, pointing them out, ‘bracketing them’, and then proceeding with the rigorous 
objective style is always the optimal way for their overcoming.
To see what I have in mind, consider a few examples; these are gathered from philo-
sophical and political science literature. Political scientists Brendan Nyhan and Jason 
Reifler have reported on the ‘backfire effect’ in political persuasion (Nyhan and Reifler, 
2010). This occurs when a participant in a debate is offered evidence that contradicts her 
preferred belief; curiously, offering such new evidence can backfire in the sense that the 
participant then doubles down on her belief rather than revises it in accordance with the 
new data. Nyhan and Reifler observed this effect in the context of the Second Gulf War, 
when pro-war subjects, who believed in the existence of Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(WMDs) in Iraq, were presented with evidence to the contrary. Afterwards, the subjects 
curiously reported a higher certainty in the existence of WMDs (Nyhan and Reifler, 2010, 
pp. 314–15; analogous findings were established on the left of the ideological spectrum 
as well). What is curious for our purposes in that the corrective evidence in these experi-
ments was invariably presented in the objective style: as impartial, factual news reports. 
And yet, such calm, evidence-driven counter-arguments have led the subjects to hold 
even tighter onto their beliefs, when we would expect them to lower their credence, or 
for it at least not to change.
To give a different case of how the objective style of discourse may fail us, consider 
Robin McKenna’s (2019) recent exploration of subjects’ weakened ability to obtain new 
justified beliefs, when these beliefs are consistent with the subject’s ideological position. 
For example, McKenna argues that subjects who identify with liberal and environmen-
talist values are less critical of studies that support the existence of climate change. While 
climate change, of course, exists, not all reports on all aspects of it will be factually 
correct, and liberal-environmentalist audiences are more likely to go along, uncritically, 
with such faulty studies. As a result, we seem less capable of obtaining new knowledge 
on issues we politically identify with, even if our views happen to be broadly correct 
(McKenna, 2019, pp. 758, 763–65; analogous cases can be found elsewhere on the polit-
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provides no additional help to our critical faculties. When strong political commitments 
are in place, it seems that we are only too happy to be led down the route that gets us to 
the desired conclusion—without applying due critical pressure on the way.
In all these cases we find what Adrian Piper has called the state of ‘pseudo-rationality’: 
the semblance of rational coherence that we inhabit to justify the beliefs we are com-
mitted to (Piper, 2013, pp. 289–96, 312–16). Piper’s point, as I understand it, is that 
such subjects need not engage in deliberate sophistry; they do not merely cynically use 
arguments to further a point they do not believe in, as Habermas at some point sug-
gested (Habermas, 1984, pp. 295ff). In fact, the subjects might quite sincerely attempt 
to bracket their biases and reason impartially; it is only that by doing so, they still weigh 
evidence or apply focus in a biased way. Our adherence to the objective style may be per-
fectly well-meaning, but this does not guarantee that our epistemic processes will pro-
ceed impeccably.
If one acknowledges such cases, the crucial question becomes: what, if anything, might 
help? What would snap a person out of their state of pseudo-rationality? As the examples 
given above demonstrate, simply trying harder, and more doggedly pursuing rational ar-
gumentation, will not always work. In those cases, we might speculate, an interlocutor’s 
sarcastic remark may make us see that we have sacrificed truth to argumentative rigour. 
Or, perhaps, a joke, or, a plaintive tone of voice, or, alternatively, creating some healthy 
ruckus, slamming the table, saying, ‘come on now, I know you are smart, but look at the 
facts!’. What—if anything—will lead to epistemic progress and acknowledgement of the 
facts will depend on the specific dynamics of the situation. Anybody who has engaged in 
protracted intellectual gymnastics over a heated political issue—or even in a debate over 
whose turn it is to do the dishes—will be, I take it, familiar with this phenomenon to an 
extent. For a given epistemic obstacle to be noted and overcome, what sometimes needs 
to happen is a shift from the objective style into another rhetorical mode.
At this juncture, it may be helpful to again acknowledge that great schism in twentieth-
century Western political theory: between those who have extolled rational deliberation 
as the best tool for political emancipation, and those who have treated the objective style 
itself as irredeemably corrupted by power relations. Rawls and Habermas, as well as most 
first-generation analytic political philosophers, may be counted within the first camp; 
ideology-critical traditions, from Theodor Adorno and Jacques Derrida to Judith Butler, 
within the second. While I do not mean the present paper to spill into the intractable 
territory of this rift, it is worth pointing out that our discussion at this point allows for a 
middle path between these extremes: a pluralist position. Sometimes, a sincere aspiration 
to discursive rationality and the objective style will offer the best available means to over-
come social epistemic obstacles. But that need not be universally the case. To dislodge the 
argument for the pre-eminence of the objective style, we need not do anything as am-
bitious (and counterproductive) as deconstruct all instances of objective-style thinking. 
Our criticism of the objective style can confine itself, more modestly but also more pre-
cisely, to isolated cases— those where objective-style thinking fails epistemically.
This, I  suggest, is the chink in the armour of objective style through which we can 
address the problem of parity. Attempting to inhabit the state of discursive rationality is 
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still need to take a few more steps to secure parity between artistic and objective genres. 
We need to demonstrate a sort of match: show that precisely in those cases where objective 
style fails, artistic devices can help overcome epistemic obstacles. That, if you like, is the 
general model. But to secure parity with any particular genre of art, or indeed any par-
ticular work of art, the discussion must now become more piecemeal and responsive to 
culturally specific contexts; philosophy must here join hands with history of the arts and 
art criticism. I will merely offer two, necessarily brief and schematic, illustrations.
5. Political Art in Context
To illustrate how parity may be achieved, I will use two examples of politically discursive 
art belonging to the recent Anglophone popular culture. Due to the United States' status 
as the global cultural hegemon, these examples do not require much of an introduction, 
which in a brief philosophical paper will have to be accepted as a somewhat unpleasant 
advantage of US hegemony. I should also say at the outset that I do not take these to be 
necessarily the most accomplished works of political art. Indeed, some of their very dis-
cernible faults will allow us to show how art participates in the public attempt at reaching 
discursive knowledge, but may (just like discourse in the objective style) both contribute 
to and detract from it.
Consider first the satirical works that were popular in the 2000s, such as Borat (2006) 
and Brüno (2009) created by Sacha Baron-Cohen, or South Park (1997–) and Team America 
(2004) by Trey Parker and Matt Stone. These works have an excessive, grotesque, 
Rabelaisian quality to them. Just as François Rabelais’ Gargantua and Pantagruel dispar-
aged all strata of the sixteenth-century society through grossness and absurdity, these 
modern satires mercilessly lacerate a variety of political positions and characters. They 
denigrate both the ideals that their liberal audiences perceive as ‘bad’ (domestic and 
imperialist forms of US chauvinism), and those they may perceive as ‘good’ (environ-
mentalism, multiculturalism, pacifism). For example, Team America derides US hawkish 
foreign policy—personified in the disastrously bumbling ‘world police’ taskforce—but 
it also lampoons the idealist, pacifist option, represented by a gang of dumb Hollywood 
actors. The primary target of Borat, meanwhile, is certainly the casual chauvinism of some 
Americans, whose openly expressed xenophobic reactions are shown in the film’s final 
cut. However, I depart from the interpretations that see Borat as unequivocally subver-
sive of xenophobia (for such an analysis, see Zupančič, 2008, p. 33). The depiction of the 
film’s protagonist as promiscuous and crude also channels stereotypes about third-world 
immigrants, and the film, I think, therefore is also at odds with a more liberal sentiment, 
which would censor such depictions as offensive. In short, these satires are decidedly 
non-partisan (and perhaps non-partisan to a fault); instead of picking a side, they denigrate 
all political positions that dominated the public sphere at the time of their making.
I shall not attempt a more detailed description of such neo-Rabelaisian satires, although 
one could certainly chart their relationship to other established genres of satire (e.g. 
Horatian, Juvenalian, Menippean, Dryden-esque and so forth) or to other subversive com-
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common to these works: the indiscriminate disparagement of opposing political positions. 
This feature is not something that we typically find in works written in the objective style, 
nor can we imagine it being easily imported into it. The objective style generally seeks 
to put forward one position at the expense of another and to do so respectfully. So, what 
could be gained epistemically by such an artistic device, by such a flurry of low blows?
The epistemic benefit of neo-Rabelaisian satire should be understood against the spe-
cific background of a polarized political space. As we saw in the previous section, subjects 
who strongly identify with a given position may find the objective style less suitable for the 
critical revision of their beliefs. Objective-style corrections may backfire, while objective-
style confirmations may be accepted uncritically. Whenever such a highly polarized pol-
itical situation obtains any loosening of the subject’s identification with her political camp 
may become epistemically useful. Neo-Rabelaisian satire, at its best, achieves just that. 
Within the world of Team America, the liberal viewer finds it just as uncomfortable to 
identify with the sanctimonious Hollywood actors as she does with the mindless mili-
tary interventionists. Borat is perhaps something of a limit case, because here even the 
political beliefs that are foundational to democracy—such as the belief that xenophobic 
stereotypes are a bad thing—are temporarily suspended in the portrayal of the protag-
onist. Now, at a wrong place, at a wrong time, in the wrong hands, this may certainly 
result in dangerous cynicism, but, at an appropriate moment, neo-Rabelaisian satire can 
aim at something that the objective-style discourse has trouble with: it can weaken the 
subject’s over-confidence in their own position. By temporarily softening our attachment 
to any of the contestant positions in the public sphere, this form of satire can recalibrate 
the critical capacity needed for the proper processing of arguments and evidence.
For my second (and quite different) example, consider what we may call visibility-
raising artworks: works that foreground the experience of oppressed and culturally 
underrepresented social groups. The recent television series Pose (2018–) is one such 
work. The series is set in the ballroom subculture of the late 1980s New York, which 
was largely run by LGBTQ and gender-non-conforming people of colour. If we think 
about what epistemic obstacles visibility-raising artworks are up against, one uncontro-
versial proposal would be: essentialization. This we may define as a tendency to explain 
somebody’s entire person—their motives, emotions, capabilities and ethos—by reference 
to a type they are perceived as belonging to. Overtly negative stereotypes are a clear case 
of essentialization, but essentialization may also inhere in subtler forms of xenophobia; for 
example, stereotypes that attribute a seemingly positive property, such as a Black person’s 
‘sense of rhythm’ or a gay man’s ‘artistic sense’ (cf. Piper, 2013, pp. 438–39). Edward 
Said describes this phenomenon succinctly in his study of Orientalism:
[In an Orientalist mindset,] [w]e are to assume that if an Arab feels joy, if he is sad at 
the death of his child or parent, if he has a sense of the injustices of political tyranny, 
then those experiences are necessarily subordinate to the sheer, unadorned, and per-
sistent fact of being an Arab.
(Said, 1978, p. 230)
As an epistemic obstacle, essentialization can lead to various false beliefs about other per-
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as xenophobia; as she puts it, xenophobia ‘reduces the complex singularity of the other’s 
properties to an oversimplified but conceptually manageable subset’. (Piper, 2013, p. 422).
Objective-style discourse certainly has a role to play in overcoming essentialization, 
by, for example, showing that stereotypes are empirically groundless. Nevertheless, we 
may suggest that objective discourse, in its very structure, makes it hard to contemplate 
individuals in their distinctiveness. Objective discourse must posit abstract groups even as 
it calls for those group’s emancipation. Therefore, even if one were to well-meaningly say 
that ‘LGBTQ individuals have faced challenges of such-and-such nature … ’ one already 
predisposes the listener to view each individual’s singular nature as primarily understood 
through their membership of that group. Of course, one may attempt to ameliorate that 
effect by various qualifications within objective discourse (‘some LGBTQ people have 
tended to … ’). Note, however, that a format like the television series does not have the 
problem of positing groups with essential characteristics built into its structure, like the 
objective style does. In a TV series, we simply follow the fate of individual characters, and 
are not given a set of theses about them as a social group.
That is not to say that every television series is wonderfully good at this; earlier epi-
sodes of Pose are, I  believe, less successful at dispelling essentialization. These involve 
several clichéd, soap-opera storylines, such as the mentor-student rivalry of Blanca and 
Elektra, so that the only salient feature in an otherwise predictable situation remains the 
social type of the protagonists. However, as the series progresses, characters increas-
ingly emerge in their individuality. Blanca’s reaction to her HIV diagnosis is particu-
larly complex, evolving from despair, to a sense of purpose and often-employed gallows 
humour. All this makes Blanca, as played by Mj Rodriguez, stand out as an individual, 
whose actions the audience cannot simply reduce to that of a ‘typical’ transwoman. If 
essentialization is an epistemic obstacle that prevents us from obtaining discursive know-
ledge about other persons (cf. Piper 2013, pp. 421ff), then the long narrative format of the 
contemporary TV series, when intelligently employed, carries certain specific advantages 
over the objective-style discourse about minoritarian subjects.
These examples fill in, I hope, the general from of the argument for parity between 
politically discursive art and objective-style discourse. In each case, the argument does 
not require us to represent some kinds of knowledge as exclusive to art alone (the 
‘unparaphrasable knowledge’ path); nor does it require a full takedown of the objective 
style (the critical theory path). Instead, we need to point at specific situations where the 
objective discourse fails us, where it becomes haunted by spectres of pseudo-rationality, 
of which dogmatism and essentialization are but two. Whenever this happens, it is to art 
that we can look for possible corrections.
6. Artworks and Arguments
There are a few objections that will hopefully bring my position into sharper relief. Firstly, 
one might object that there is no necessary link between the artworks I have discussed 
and their epistemic benefits. Surely, it is possible to imagine an objective-style article that 
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example) or to behold persons in their singular nature (my second). Indeed, that is true. 
However, as we saw at the outset of this paper, it seems patently wrong to think that any 
epistemic shift can be achieved exclusively through either art or through objective dis-
course. Such exclusivity cannot obtain because objective and artistic discourses overlap. 
Works of art may sometimes point to general trends or facts, and works written in the 
objective style may sometimes incorporate satirical turns of phrase, detailed descriptions 
and so forth. The question here is what epistemic obstacles and benefits tend to inhabit 
different rhetorical modes. The arts can overcome forms of pseudo-rationality that the 
objective style suffers from, just as, undoubtedly, the objective style can excise epistemic 
obstacles that it would be more arduous to remove through the arts.
Another objection may point to the epistemic weaknesses of the individual artworks 
I have described. Artworks, of course, can create epistemic obstacles as well as offer re-
sources. For example, while the neo-Rabelaisian satires may invigorate our critical cap-
acities, as I suggested, one could certainly protest that they can also weaken our critical 
capacities with their use of crude stereotypes. With regards to my other example, Pose, 
I  have suggested the series removes the epistemic obstacle of essentialization. But one 
may protest that I have unduly privileged the epistemic interests of the hegemonic (white, 
heteronormative) audience when I  should have also considered the epistemic interests 
of the people represented in the series. The epistemic needs of an oppressed group may 
be quite different from those of the mainstream; as Paul C. Taylor has argued in Black 
Aesthetics, for example, a positive self-understanding of an oppressed group might de-
pend on creating opportunities for authenticity and belonging, as much as on battling 
stereotypes and essentialization (Taylor, 2017, pp. 132–52).
Such polemical points strengthen, rather than weaken, the case for the cognitive value 
of political art. Criticisms of specific artworks on epistemic grounds may be justified, but 
we ought to think of such criticism as analogous to objections and counter-arguments that 
any philosophical essay is likely to invite as well. Discursive knowledge is rarely settled 
conclusively in a single contribution, and its goal is not a state of dogmatic certainty that 
would admit no further objection or thought. Artworks (just as works of objective-style 
discourse) show themselves to be a part of the cognitive enterprise precisely in virtue of 
inviting objections or re-interpretations.
Such discursive responses to artworks can be offered through art criticism, but also 
through the development of artistic forms themselves. For example, certain recent televi-
sion series perform a similar loosening on their audience’s strongly held, ‘right-on’ beliefs 
as neo-Rabelaisian satires did in the early 2000s, but they do so by creating morally un-
settling, flawed protagonists, rather than by employing crude stereotypes (I here have in 
mind works like Michaela Cole’s brilliant television series I May Destroy You (2020)). There 
is cognitive progress here, in the sense that art now avoids artistic devices, which, on re-
flection, we think left us epistemically worse off, or unduly muddled the public debate. 
The correction here is analogous to, say, a shift in the concepts we use in the objective 
style, or to a shift in arguments we offer.
If artworks can be thought of, in this way, as engaging in a common polemic, this also 
helps to clarify the difference between attributing discursive knowledge to artworks, as 
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for art (see Section 2 above). It seems unlikely to me that the artworks I have discussed 
impart significant experiential or practical knowledge. For example, we do not go up to 
victims of political oppression and say ‘I know how it must feel; I have read many novels 
about oppression’, nor do we consult artworks in preparation for some distinctly prac-
tical challenge. If you also find such claims counterintuitive, then it may come as a relief 
that the current position does not imply them. There is no claim here that some distinct 
know-how or wisdom is acquired, nor that artworks are substitutes for lived experience. 
Artworks are simply contributions to a public debate. Those that are best at it will leave 
their audiences with beliefs better attuned to how the world is, in ways that would not 
have been possible had those audiences engaged in the objective-style debate alone.
We ought to think, then, of serious political art as much more tightly interlaced with 
our ‘non-art’ ways of thinking about the world. To achieve a parity between these ways 
of thinking, I have suggested, we must show how pseudo-rationality rises up in one rhet-
orical style, and is then met by countermeasures in another. This is the general model; 
more fine-grained accounts would demonstrate how this works for specific artistic genres 
or even specific artworks or movements. Acquiring discursive knowledge in a politic-
ally changing world is a dynamic process, which requires shifts from objective to artistic 
registers and back again; indeed, it requires constant reinvention of rhetorical and art-
istic modes. But while this means that the objective style of enquiry is displaced from 
its preeminent place in democratic deliberation, philosophers ought not to feel too des-
pondent about it. Public discourse requires a plurality of communicative styles: not a hier-
archical procession with the objective style at the helm, but a concert of rhetorical modes 
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